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INTRODUCTION 
Although replete with vituperative rhetoric, the Brief of Appellee Gayle Ball ("Ball") is 
devoid of analysis or legal authority to refute the numerous instances of error identified by 
Appellant David Peterson ("Peterson"). In response to every issue raised by Peterson, Ball 
relies on the "broad discretion" of the trial court in dealing with matters of child support. While 
Peterson clearly recognizes that trial courts are vested with substantial discretion in dealing with 
domestic litigation, many of the issues in this appeal involve the trial court's interpretation and 
application of statutory provisions. These issues are questions of law, which are reviewed for 
correctness. Even as to those issues committed to the discretion of the trial court, by findings 
sufficient to permit this court to determine whether the trial court's action was rationally based. 
As to both the legal and factual issues identified in Peterson's opening brief, Ball has completely 
failed to provide support for the trial court's actions challenged through this appeal. 
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court must be reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in retroactively modifying Peterson's child support obligations 
for periods prior to the filing of Ball's petition for modification, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(2). 
Ball has conceded, as she must, that Utah law flatly proscribes retroactive modification 
of child support obligations. See Appellee's Brief at 11. Indeed, section 30-3-10.6(2) of the 
Utah Code Ann. and numerous decisions of this court have established that "[i]n no event may 
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the award be retroactively increased beyond the period during which the modification petition 
was pending." Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 1994); accord Cummings v. 
Cummings. 821 P.2d 472, 480-81 (Utah App. 1991). It is readily apparent from the face of the 
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, however, that a substantial part of 
Peterson's alleged child support arrearages are based on a retroactive application of the 
modification sought through Ball's Counterpetition to Modify, which was not filed until 
December 1993. 
It is undisputed that Ball's Counter-Petition was not filed until the end of December 1993. 
It is also undisputed that the then existing child support order was entered in February 1992. 
Under the February 1992 support order, Peterson was obligated to pay $1547.00 per month. 
This amount represents Peterson's child support obligation, at least until the filing of Ball's 
Counterpetition in December 1993. As reflected in the trial courts's Findings and Conclusions, 
however, Peterson has been assessed "arrearages" for the months from June 1992 through July 
1993 because he was not paying Ball $1745.00 per month. Peterson's child support obligation 
was not $1745.00 during 1992 or 1993. No petition to modify was filed No order modifying 
his child support obligation had been entered. 
Ball implicitly concedes this point in her brief when she explains that these purported 
arrearages were derived from "amounts [that] were changed . . . pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.10 which provides for an automatic change without the need for an Order to Show 
Cause or Petition to Modify . . . ." Appellee's Brief at 11. In other words there was no 
petition to modify or other request for judicial modification of Peterson's support obligation. 
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Apparently Ball contends Peterson was simply supposed to know that his support obligation had 
been "automatically" increased by an event that occurred almost immediately after the 
determination of his support obligation in February 1992.l 
At the time the February 1992 Order was entered, there were four minor children living 
with Ball and the oldest minor child, Cameron, was living with Peterson. The court ordered 
child support of $1547 based on this custody arrangement. Less than a month later, Cameron 
attained age 18. He continued to live with Peterson and the four remaining minor children 
continued to live with Ball. Because the number of minor children living with Ball had not 
changed, Peterson continued to pay the ordered support of $1547.00 per month throughout this 
period from June 1992 (when Cameron Peterson had attained majority and graduated from high 
school) through August of 1993 (when Cynthia Peterson moved into Peterson's home). The 
"arrearages" assessed by the trial court are clearly predicated on the assumption that Peterson 
should have been paying $1745 per month during this time. Such a determination represents an 
improper retroactive modification of support obligation for periods prior to the filing of Ball's 
Counterpetition, which did not occur until December 1993. 
'As set forth more fully below, Ball contends that the $1547 per month award established 
by the February 1992 order should have "automatically" increased pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.10, in March 1992 when the parties' oldest child, Cameron, who was living with 
Peterson, attained majority and converted a 4-1 split custody scenario into situation in which 
there were only 4 minor children - all living with Ball. Peterson contends this is an erroneous 
application of that statute. See discussion at 7-13 below. For purposes of the "retroactivity" 
issue, however, it must be noted that Ball did not even raise the argument that Peterson should 
have paid $1745 per month until January 31. 1994, when she filed an Affidavit in Support of 
her Counterpetition to Modify [R. at 760]. 
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Ball asserts, without citation of either legal or factual support, that the trial court's 
assessment of "arrearages" with respect to amounts Peterson had never been ordered to pay was 
within its "broad discretion." See Appellee's Brief at 12. A trial court's discretion, however, 
does not entitle it to ignore controlling statutes and established case law. Indeed, Ball's own 
brief concedes that the appropriate standard of review with respect to the trial court's apparent 
retroactive increase of Peterson's support obligations is a "correctness" standard. See Appellee's 
Brief at 1. The unequivocal language of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(2) and established case 
law interpreting it, unquestionably preclude retroactive modifications of support obligations and 
that portion of the district court's award must be reversed. 
II. The trial court erred in retroactively applying the 1994 amendments to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7 et seq., which require child support payments to continue until 
children graduate from high school, to modify Peterson's child support obligations 
and to assess arrearages based on Peterson's non-compliance with statutes that were 
not yet in effect, with respect to Peterson's children Cameron2 and Patrice and, 
both of whom had attained majority prior to the enactment of the 1994 
amendments. 
The parties' original Decree of Decree of Divorce stated that Peterson's child support 
obligation would continue "until each child reaches the age of 18 years, or becomes 
emancipated, whichever shall first occur." [R. at 272]. The February 25, 1992 Order modifying 
2Peterson's Opening Brief incorrectly refers to Cynthia Peterson in the statement of this issue 
as one of the parties' children who attained age 18 prior to July 1, 1994. The text of the brief 
correctly identifies Cameron and Patrice as the two children two whom this issue relates. 
Moreover, Peterson concedes now, as he did in his opening brief, see Appellant's Brief at 18 
& n. 5, that the district court's error as to the time Cameron attained majority worked in his 
favor. Ball's allegations that Peterson has "unclean hands" because he raises "retroactivity" 
issues only when they are in his favor, see Appellee's Brief at 14, are unfounded. 
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the Decree did not alter or extend the time for which Peterson was responsible for making child 
support payments. [R. at 726-29]. A portion of the arrearages assessed against Peterson, 
however, are based on the assumption that Peterson's support obligation continued until each 
child reached 18 and graduated from high school. This represents a retroactive application of 
amendments to § 78-45-7.10 which were effective as of July 1, 1994. That amendment has the 
effect of extending the period of time for which child support is owed when a child reaches the 
age of 18 before he or she graduates from high school. Both Cameron Peterson and Patrice 
Peterson reached 18 before July 1, 1994. It is therefore improper to assess arrearages with 
respect to these children on the basis of a retroactive application of this substantive change in 
child support law. 
Ball does not dispute that the district court assessed arrearages based on the assumption 
that Peterson's support obligation should have continued until the Cameron and Patrice graduated 
from high school. See Appellee's Brief at 12-13. Instead, Ball argues that this Court's decision 
in Thornblad v. Thornblad. 849 P.2d 1197 (Utah App. 1993), grants district courts discretion 
to extend support obligations until graduation. Ball misses the point entirely. Without question 
Thornblad holds that a court may exercise its discretion to extend child support obligations. In 
order to do this, however, Thornblad requires that the court make specific "findings of necessity 
and special circumstances to justify extending [the child's ] support obligation until graduation." 
849 P.2d at 1199. The district court in Thornblad made such findings of changed circumstances, 
which were upheld on appeal as warranting the extension of the support obligation. 
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Equally without question is the discussion in Thomblad as to the impropriety of 
"retroactively" modifying support obligations until the child graduates. Addressing this issue, 
the Court of Appeals stated: 
However, the trial court incorrectly applied the modification retroactively to 
October 1. 1990. the date Mr. Thornblad ceased support payments for 
Christopher. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(2) (1992) establishes that 
[al child or spousal support payment under a child support order 
may be modified with respect to any period during which a petition 
for modification is pending, but only from the date notice of that 
petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or 
to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
Notice of Mrs. Thornblad's petition for modification was served on Mr. 
Thornblad on February 11, 1991. The order of modification can only be applied 
retroactively to that date. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the support 
obligation applicable from October 4, 1990, to February 11, 1991. 
Id, at 1200 (emphasis added). 
Peterson does not dispute that the district court has the discretionary power to extend 
child support obligations until the time the parties' children graduated. In the present case, 
however, no such discretion was exercised. No findings of changed circumstances or special 
necessity were made. Instead the court simply repeated the language from the post-July 1, 1994 
version of § 78-45-7.10. See Findings at K3 [R. at 1122-23]. The district court's calculation of 
arrearages mistakenly assumes that, as a matter of law, Peterson's support obligation for each 
child continues until the child reaches 18 and graduates from high school. With respect to 
Cameron and Patrice, both of whom had reached 18 prior to the effective date (or enactment) 
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of the 1994 amendments to section 7.10, the retroactive application of the substantive change 
in the guidelines is improper and must be reversed. 
III. The trial court erred in interpreting § 78-45-7.10 of the Utah Code Ann. to require 
an "automatic" increase in Peterson's child support obligation when Cameron, the 
child living with Peterson and establishing "split" custody, attained majority, given 
that the number of minor residing with Ball remained unchanged. 
The legal effect of Cameron Peterson's attaining majority raises a further issue of 
statutory interpretation and application. As with the issues discussed above, Ball again attempts 
to hide the district court's legal error under the cloak of "discretion." See Appellee's Brief at 
14-15. The February 1992 Order, which established Peterson's child support obligation through 
the modification at issue in this appeal, states: 
1. Child support in the amount of $1547.00 per month is awarded 
pursuant to the statutory child support guidelines for split custody, there being 
four children with plaintiff, and one child with defendant, said award 
commencing with November 1, 1991. 
[R. at 729]. Neither the February 1992 Order nor the supporting Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law made by the district court at that time contain any statement as to the effect 
upon Peterson's child support obligation of Cameron's reaching the age of 18. Less than a 
month later, on March 13, 1992, Cameron Peterson turned 18. 
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Utah's statutory scheme for child support includes a specific provision dealing with the 
effect of children reaching majority. Section 78-45-7.10 of the Utah Code Ann., which is entitled 
"Reduction when child becomes 18." (emphasis added) states3: 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, the base combined child 
support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base combined 
child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining number of 
children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support 
order. 
(emphasis added). Although this statute is entitle "Reduction when child becomes 18" and the 
express language of the statute refers to awards being "automatically reduced," the district court 
awarded arrearages against Peterson based upon an "automatic" recalculation and increase in 
Peterson's support obligation when Cameron Peterson reached majority and the 4-1 "split" 
custody was replaced by 4-0 "sole" custody calculation. It is upon this basis that Ball claims 
Peterson should have paid as much as $1745.00 per month even though no support order ever 
required him to pay more than $1547.00 per month. 
Without any case authority, legislative history or other apparent basis, Ball purports to 
know the legislature's intent. According to Ball, § 78-45-7.10 is intended "to provide for the 
automatic support adjustment without the expense and hassle of a court proceeding." Appellee's 
Brief at 14. The plain language of the statute, however, does not support Ball's interpretation. 
The statute states that child support awards should be "reduced to reflect the lower base 
3
 As noted above, this statute was amended effective July 1, 1994 to extend the event 
triggering reduction under this statute until the child graduates from high school. The statutory 
text quoted here is the language of the statute as it read in March 1992, when Cameron Peterson 
attained the age of 18. 
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combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining number of children 
due child support . . . ." (emphasis added). 
At the time of the February 1992 Order, Peterson was supporting four of his minor 
children in Ball's household and paying $1547.00 per month. Because the remaining number 
of children due child support (i.e. the children living with Ball) remained unchanged after 
Cameron Peterson reached majority, Peterson properly believed that his child support obligation 
remained unchanged. 
The $1547.00 per month support figure was established by an Order dated February 25, 
1992. Within three weeks of that Order, Cameron reached his eighteenth birthday. It is 
apparent that neither the parties nor the district court believed that the support award contained 
in the February Order would be superseded within such a short period of time. The fact that 
Ball failed to seek the increased support of nearly $200 per month until two years later is 
compelling evidence that she did not interpret the February 1992 Order to require such increased 
payments. It is inequitable an unjust for Ball to advance an argument for the first time after 
thousands of dollars in supposed "arrearages" had accrued. 
Ball accuses Peterson's counsel "of playing semantics . . . in bad faith" on this issue. 
Appellee's Brief at 15. This attack not only on Peterson but on the counsel representing him 
is unwarranted and offensive. It is incomprehensible how Ball can claim that Peterson's 
argument regarding § 78-45-7.10 is not made in good faith. Peterson's argument is based on 
the plain language of the statute! A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation in Utah is that 
courts must look first to the plain language of the statute. K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 
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623, 627 (Utah 1994); State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); Schurtz v. BMW of 
N. America. 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Harmon v. Ogden City. 258 Ut. Adv. Rptr. 5, 
(Ut. App. Feb. 9, 1995). Moreover, courts are required "to assume that each term in the statute 
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 
664, 670 (Utah 1991). 
Ball asserts that "[s]urely Peterson's counsel can see that the legislature would never have 
intended" § 78-45-7.10 to be read literally and limited to the plain meaning of their terms. 
Appellee's Brief at 15. This assertion falls flat in the face of the recent pronouncement from 
the Utah Supreme Court that: 
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are not to infer substantive 
terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be 
based on the language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to 
conform to an intention not expressed. 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). Ball makes 
no effort to analyze the language of the statute. Instead, she simply asserts, without citation to 
any authority, that her interpretation is "clearly the intent of the legislature." Appellee's Brief 
at 14. The Utah Supreme Court has held, however, that "if the statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, the Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent." Brinkerhoff 
v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); accord World Peace Movement of Am. v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp.. 879 P.2d 253, 359 (Utah 1994) ("Only when we find ambiguity in 
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the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant 
policy considerations.") 
Notwithstanding Ball's ad hominem attacks on Peterson (and Peterson's counsel), nothing 
in § 78-45-7.10 supports the conclusion that a child support obligation can be "automatically" 
increased, without notice to the paying party or any court action, when a child of the payor 
attains majority. The argument that a change in circumstances of the parties should give rise 
to a later claim for child support arrearages was firmly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985). In that case, the parties agreed that one of the 
parties' children would move from the custodial parent's home to the home of the non-custodial 
parent. The parties stipulated to a modification of custody but did not modify the child support 
order until approximately a year later. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rejection 
of a claim that the change in custody gave rise to an automatic change in the child support 
award. The Supreme Court explained: "Thus, while custody had changed, the order regarding 
support payments had not and was a valid existing order until March 1983." Id. at 702 
(emphasis added). 
There are innumerable potential changes of circumstance that can bring about a 
modification of a child support award. Section 78-45-7.10, by its own terms, deals with only 
one. Where a child for whom a support payor is making support payment attains majority (and, 
after July 1, 1994 graduates from high school), this statute indicates that the obligor's payments 
are automatically reduced to the level appropriate for the "remaining number of children due 
support." For other changes in circumstance, such as moving from one parent's home to the 
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other (as seen in Stettler) or where the child attaining majority is not a child for whom the 
support obligor is making support payments (as in the present case) and for the myriad of other 
potential changes in circumstance that will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, § 78-45-
7.10 simply does not effect an "automatic" modification of child support obligations. 
Accordingly, there was no basis in the present case for the trial court to retroactively modify 
Peterson's existing support obligations based on Cameron Peterson's attaining majority in March 
1992 and to assess nearly two years of arrearages on the basis of a supposedly "automatic" 
modification of Peterson's support obligations of which neither he nor Ball were aware at the 
time.4 
Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need for this court to delve into issues 
of policy. For purposes of analytical completeness, however, Peterson offers the following 
response to Ball's vigorous assertion that the legislature has expressed an "intent to provide for 
the automatic support adjustment without the expense and hassle of a court proceeding." 
Appellee's Brief at 14. As desirable as it may be to have support awards that adjust without the 
need for court action, the law has and must place a greater value on parties being able to 
ascertain their legal obligations. A statute that effects "automatic" changes in support obligations 
4As stated in Upland Industries Corp. V. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 642 
(Utah 1984), the parties' pre-litigation conduct is a very persuasive indicator of their 
contemporaneous understanding of their rights and obligations. If Ball actually believed that she 
was due an additional $200 per month in child support when Cameron Peterson reached age 18, 
it was incumbent upon her to give Peterson some notice of this fact rather than seeking 
thousands of dollars in arrearages and attorneys' fees two years later. The fact that no such 
claim for support was advanced until January 1994 is indicative of the fact that Ball did not 
believe, in March 1992, that Peterson owed additional support. 
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is of no utility if neither of the parties understand the change to have taken place until years 
later. It is difficult to perceive how such a result would reduce the parties' expenses or the 
"hassle" involved in determining — at every point in time — the amount of the support obligation 
owed. 
IV. The trial court erred in calculating Peterson's child support obligations under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7J5 by giving Ball credit for medical insurance payments which 
she does not, in fact, pay and which are purchased by her current spouse to cover 
his children from a previous marriage. 
In Peterson's Opening Brief, the evidence on this issue was carefully marshaled to 
support the decision and the conclusion was nonetheless inescapable: Ball is receiving credit in 
the calculation of the child support obligation for medical insurance premiums that are being 
made by her current spouse. [R. at 1213-14]. The insurance is a "family policy" obtained 
through the employer of Ball's present spouse which is paid for by deductions from her spouse's 
paycheck. [R. at 1219]. The coverage provided by that policy extends to Ball's present spouse, 
Ball herself, the children from Ball's spouse's previous marriage and some the parties' children. 
Under the district court's ruling, Ball is credited with $100 per month of medial insurance 
payments. See [R. at 1004] (attached to Peterson's Opening Brief as Attachment 4). This 
determination is clearly erroneous. 
Without citing any supporting evidence from the record, Ball disingenuously claims that 
"Ball has paid for the insurance she has purchased . . . ." Appellee's Brief at 15. This 
insupportable claim that Ball "pays" for this insurance is rationalized on the next page of Ball's 
brief where she concedes that 
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It makes no difference how insurance is paid, and/or who signs a check when 
funds come from the family budget. If one parent makes a purchase for clothing, 
food, or even medical insurance, the child support payments from another spouse 
reimbursed the pooled resources of the family. . . . [T]his is how family budgets 
operate, and that all child support orders and guidelines are made taking this into 
consideration. 
Appellee's Brief at 16 (emphasis added). Without taking time to dispute the patently ridiculous 
assertion that Ball knows how all family budgets operate, her claim that this is how the child 
support guidelines function is -- as a matter of law — simply wrong. Section 78-45-7.4. of the 
Utah Code Ann. expressly provides that "Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines." In other words, the "pooled 
resources" of Ball and her new husband are irrelevant to the calculation of Peterson's child 
support obligation/ If Ball were remarried to a billionaire and his children were living in 
palatial luxury with Ball's new spouse, Peterson's child support obligation would remain 
unchanged. For purposes of calculating child support, it is only the incomes and expenses of 
Peterson and Ball that are relevant. 
5In an apparent attempt to construct a reductio ab absurdum argument, Ball further asserts 
that "Plaintiff's Counsel may as well argue that he should see every check written for food 
clothing and everything else . . . ." Appellee's Brief at 16. This argument too demonstrates 
lack of understanding of Utah's child support laws. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.20 
a support payor is entitled to an accounting, including receipts, of amounts expended for the 
child's benefit. This is not, however, the point. Medical insurance premiums are different that 
amounts spent for food, clothing and other necessities because those items are presumably 
covered by the base child support obligation. Medical insurance premiums are added to the base 
child support award and have separate specific statutory procedures for determining the proper 
amount to be added to the obligor's support obligation. Moreover, Ball's argument pointlessly 
focuses on the "non-issue" of which spouse "wrote the checks" for the medical insurance 
premiums. See Appellee's Brief at 16. The clear evidence in this case is that no checks were 
being written for the medical insurance premiums. These premiums were deducted from Ball's 
spouse's paycheck to provide insurance for many more people than the parties' children 
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The plain language of Utah's statutes also demonstrates the district court's error. Section 
78-45-7.7 of the Utah Code Ann. states that "the children's portion of any monthly payments 
made directly by each parent for medical and dental insurance premiums", (emphasis 
added)6, should be used in making the child support calculation. The 1994 amendments to the 
child support guidelines clarify that "[E]ach parent [is] to share equally the out-of-pocket costs 
of the premiums actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of the insurance." Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45-7.15(3) (emphasis added). The statutory language is unmistakable. Only 
premiums paid by parents are entitled to be considered in calculating child support obligations. 
Because the medical insurance payments do not come from Ball's income, they cannot be used 
to modify Peterson's support obligation. 
A further respect in which the ruling with respect to medical insurance is clearly 
erroneous it that it is based on an obvious arithmetic error. Under the district court's decision, 
Ball is receiving a credit of $100 per month for medical insurance premiums that she is 
"paying." The child support worksheet showing the derivation of this $100 figure, [R. at 1004] 
(Attachment 4 to Peterson's Opening Brief), indicates that Ball is getting credit for 4/7 of the 
$175.50 premium "paid" by Ball. There is no dispute that only two of the parties' children are 
covered by Ball's insurance. Thus, 2/7, which would yield a credit of $50.14—if the amount 
were actually paid by Ball. This error, which was identified in Peterson's Opening Brief, is not 
controverted or defended by Ball in her brief. 
6The quoted text is the version of the statute in effect prior to the 1994 amendments. It 
contains the procedure in effect at the time of the trial in this matter. 
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In response to this overwhelming authority, Ball again responds that it is within the 
district court's discretion to make its child support calculations on the basis of "a family budget 
of pooled resources." Appellee's Brief at 16. This is not correct. The district court does not 
have discretion to ignore the clear mandate of a statute which specifically indicates that only 
medical premiums actually paid by a parent may be considered. Notwithstanding the broad 
discretion given to trial courts in such matters, where the legislature has spoken a district court 
cannot ignore its mandate.7 
V. There is no basis for awarding attorneys fees to Ball in this matter. 
Amazingly, a mere three pages after Ball claimed that her family "like all families" 
functions on "pooled assets," see Appellee's Brief at 16, Ball claims that she is entitled to an 
award of attorneys' fees on the basis of "her meager income below the minimum wage level." 
Id. at 19. The evidence before the district court was clearly to the contrary. Defendant's 
Exhibit 14, the 1993 Federal Tax Return for Ball and her current spouse indicated gross income 
of $73,987. In addition to this amount, Ball received tax-free child support payments from 
7On this issue too, Ball again engages in an ad hominem attack on both Peterson and 
Peterson's counsel. Appellee's Brief at 16 ("Peterson and his counsel cannot seriously raise an 
issue of an abuse of discretion, except in complete bad faith.") As demonstrated above, 
Peterson's position is directly supported by the unequivocal language of controlling Utah statutes 
and by uncontroverted citations from the record in this case. It is Ball whose good faith must 
seriously be questioned. As noted above, it is dishonest to argue that "Peterson cites nothing 
from the record showing who signed all the checks," id., when the record that unequivocally 
demonstrates that there were no checks at ail-that these medical insurance premiums were 
directly deducted from the paycheck of Ball's spouse. This assertion, in light of the record on 
appeal, appears to fall short of the obligations imposed by Rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
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Peterson during 1993 of at least $14,503 [R. at 1121]. Thus, the "family" income available to 
Ball was nearly $90,000 in 1993. Although Ball's personal income was modest, it is clear that 
she voluntarily changed employment to a lower paying job [R. at 1207] and that she anticipated 
quitting her employment entirely in order to spend time with her family. [R at 1216]. Peterson 
does not begrudge Ball's election not to pursue more lucrative employment given her current 
spouse's substantial income. It is patently absurd, however, for a person with a household 
income of nearly $90,000 per year to argue that she is impoverished. 
The issue of attorneys fees was argued at length before the trial court. [R. at 1222-32]. 
At that time Ball's counsel acknowledged that the trial court had never, in any of the 
proceedings relating to this divorce, awarded her attorneys' fees. [R. at 1222]. Acting on the 
basis of all the relevant information, the trial court again denied Ball's request for fees. [R. 
at 1124]. This determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Lvngle v. 
Lyngle. 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah App.1992); Nielson v. Nielson. 826 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah 
App. 1991). Nothing in Appellee's Brief demonstrates an abuse of that discretion. 
It must also be noted that the record is devoid of evidence supporting an award of 
attorneys fees. It is undisputed that Ball's counsel is the brother of her present spouse. There 
is no evidence in the record indicating that Ball has actually paid any fees whatsoever to her 
attorney. No Affidavit of Fees in compliance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
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Conduct or any other evidence of fees was offered by Ball in the court below. Accordingly, the 
district court acted well within its discretion in denying Ball's request for fees.8 
VI. The trial court erred by failing to make appropriate findings as to an "appropriate 
and just" support amount, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12, where the 
combined incomes of Peterson and Ball exceeded the highest level specified in the 
Child Support Guidelines. 
The district court's 1995 Order determined that Peterson's monthly gross income was 
$14,583 and that Ball's monthly gross income was $732.00. These figures produce a total well 
above the highest level specified in the Utah Uniform Child Support tables. Under these 
circumstances, the trial court is obligated to determine "an appropriate and just" amount of child 
support, which "may not be less than the highest level specified in the table for the number of 
children due support." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12. In exercising this discretion, the trial 
court must make findings that are specific enough "to ensure that the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based." Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 994 (Utah 1986). 
Moreover, "findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, failure to make 
adequate findings is an abuse of discretion. Id.; Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909, 911-12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
8Ball also failed to properly raise this issue on appeal. The trial court ruled against Ball on 
her request for fees. Ball failed to file a timely notice of appeal on this issue. Instead, she 
simply raised the question of fees in her Appellee's Brief. Significantly, in Ball's listing of the 
"Issues on Appeal" she failed to identify how this issue was preserved for appeal. See Appellee's 
Brief at 4. 
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The district court failed to make any findings to support this award. The court's entire 
statement on this issue is as follows: 
The previous monthly gross income of the Defendant was found to be 
$10,500.00. the Court finds that the Defendant's monthly gross income is now 
$14,583.00, and that the monthly gross income for the Plaintiff shall be imputed 
to be at the minimum wage level. 
9. Based upon the above figures, child support should be awarded to 
Plaintiff in the amount of $1,520.00 pursuant to the child support schedules. 
[R. at 1120]. In her brief, Ball provides the mathematical equation used by her counsel to 
determine the extrapolated "Base Combined Child Support Obligation" which Ball asserts should 
be $2399 per month. Appellee's Brief at 17. Ball concedes that the figure is merely a linear 
extrapolation based on the ratio of the highest award in the guidelines to the actual combined 
income of the parties. Id. There are at least two fundamental problems with this analysis. 
First, there is no supporting case law in Utah holding that a "straight line" extrapolation 
above the highest award in the guidelines. By statute, the trial court is required to determine 
"an appropriate and just" amount of child support, which "may not be less than the highest level 
specified in the table for the number of children due support." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that an appropriate and just award flows mathematically 
from the guidelines — regardless of the incomes involved. It is easy to envision circumstances 
under which child support awards could be ridiculously above any possible need of a child to 
be supported. 
Although there are no Utah appellate decisions on this issue, the en banc decision of the 
Supreme Court of Missouri in Mehra v. Mehra. 819 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1991) (for the 
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convenience of the Court, a copy of this decision is attached hereto as Attachment "A") is 
directly on point. This case involved a child support guideline statute much like Utah's that had 
a maximum monthly income figure of $10,000. The trial court awarded child support based 
upon a "straight line" extrapolation above the highest amount in Missouri's table. The Missouri 
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed this determination. It held: 
We interpret the schedule differently. Court-ordered child support, as provided 
by statute, is to be an amount "reasonable or necessary " for support of the child 
and not to provide an accumulation of capital. . . . The amounts indicated on the 
schedule are but a presumption of the proper level of support, given the monthly 
income of the parties and we find that the trial court's mode of extrapolation 
beyond the confines of the schedule unjustified in the absence of any specific 
finding that the $1550 figure is unjust or inappropriate. 
Id. at 354 (emphasis added). 
Second, the methodology used by Ball to extrapolate is questionable. Her analysis 
assumes that each incremental block of income is subject to the same percentage of child support 
obligation. A review of the guidelines, however, quickly demonstrates that this is not correct. 
The support guidelines for 3 children require support of $356 per month for income of $1100, 
or 32%. For monthly incomes of $10,1000, however, the support obligation is $1808, or 18%. 
Thus it is apparent that the incremental child support decreases with higher levels of monthly 
income. In light of this gradual decrease in incremental support obligation, Ball's extrapolation 
methodology substantially overstates the appropriately extrapolated award. Attached hereto as 
Attachment "B" is a handout from the Seminar of the Utah Fellows of the American Academy 
of Matrimonial Lawyers Seminar on "Dealing with Special Problems in Divorce," held in Salt 
Lake City in December 1994, in which the methodology used by some domestic practitioners 
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and commissioners in this state is described. If the parties' base support obligation were 
calculated using this "extrapolation by incremental percentage ratio" (i.e. $10 of additional 
support for every $100 in monthly income above $10,100 per month) the "Base Combined 
Support Obligation" in this case would be $2,128 per month as opposed to $2399 as calculated 
by Ball. The discrepancy is substantial. Over the period of time involved in this case, 
thousands of dollars are at issue. 
The district court clearly failed to make findings that are "sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual 
issue [in setting the support award] was reached." Cf. Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 
(Utah App. 1990). Although, Peterson urged the trial court to consider all the relevant factors 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3) in making an award outside that specified by the 
guidelines, in the absence of any findings, however, it is not possible to assess what method was 
used for determining Peterson's obligation. Even if the district court were to make findings that 
an "appropriate and just" award would exceed the highest amount in the guidelines, the 
extrapolation performed by Ball improperly overstates Peterson's support obligation. It is 
therefore necessary to remand this issue for further consideration by the trial court. 
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VII. The trial court erred in determining that there had been a material change in 
circumstances, warranting a modification of Peterson's child support obligations 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6) because, if properly calculated, Peterson's 
support obligations under current guidelines do not vary by more than 25% from 
the previous support order. 
A material change in circumstances warranting modification of a child support award is 
defined by statute in Utah to exist present "if there is a difference of at least 25% between the 
existing order and the guidelines." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6). Thus, the relevant inquiry 
for a district court to make in assessing the existence of a material change in circumstances not 
whether there has been an increase in incomes but rather whether the increases in the parties' 
incomes would produce a 25% different result in child support obligation. The Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law entered by the district court in this case unambiguously demonstrate that 
the court focused on the wrong issue: 
The Court finds that there has been a material change of circumstances of 
at least 25% and a modification of the previous decree is in order . . . The 
previous monthly gross income of the Defendant was found to be $10,500. The 
Court finds that the Defendant's monthly gross income is now $14,583. and that 
the monthly gross income for the Plaintiff shall be imputed at the minimum wage 
level. 
Based upon the above figures, child support should be awarded to Plaintiff 
in the amount of $1520.00 pursuant to the child support schedules. 
[R. at 1120] (emphasis added). Clearly the district court focused on the increase in Peterson's 
monthly salary and not on whether that increase would modify his support obligation by more 
than 25%. See Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P.2d 955, 959 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that there was 
no material change of circumstances even where there was a dramatic change in parties' incomes 
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because the existing award was based on another state's guidelines and the new incomes did not 
produce a 25 % change under Utah's guidelines.) Under precisely the same reasoning as Brooks, 
this matter should be remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether there has 
been a 25% change in the level of support previously ordered. In light of the numerous errors 
outlined above, Peterson's support obligation will certainly need to be recalculated. When this 
obligation is properly recalculated, Peterson believes that it will not vary from the previously 
ordered amount by 25 %. 
CONCLUSION 
The brief filed by Appellee Gayle Ball does not substantially dispute the issues raised by 
Peterson on this appeal. Ball has not disagreed with a single point of law or argued that any of 
Peterson's "Issues on Appeal" were not properly preserved. On virtually all points, Ball has 
simply asserted that the district court had sufficient discretion to support its determinations in 
this case. Peterson has properly identified the standards of review applicable to this issues in 
this appeal. Many of the alleged errors involve interpretation and application of statutes, which 
are not matters within the district court's discretion. Even as to the issues committed to the 
discretion of the district court, such discretion must be rationally exercised and supported by 
adequate findings. For the reasons stated above, Appellant Peterson hereby requests that this 
Court reverse and remand to the district court for further consideration the order modifying 
decree of divorce entered herein on January 30, 1995. 
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Subodh R. MEHRA, Defendant-
Appellant-Cross-
Respondent, 
Rachna MEHRA, Plaintiff-Respondent-
Cross-Appellant. 
No. 73748. 
MEHRA v. MEHRA Mo. 351 
Cite as 819 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.banc 1991) 
2. Divorce «=»184(4, 7) 
Fupreme Court defers to fact finder's 
deten linations of credibility, viewing evi-
dence and permissible inferences therefrom 
in fight most favorable to dissolution de-
cree, disregarding all contrary evidence 
and inferences. 
Supreme Court of Missouri, 
En Banc. 
Nov. 19, 1991. 
Marriage dissolution decree was en-
tered by the Circuit Court, St. Louis Coun-
ty, Steven Goldman, J., in which child sup-
port guidelines were applied to monthly 
incomes in excess of $10,000. Husband 
and wife appealed. Case was transferred 
and the Supreme Court, Rendlen, J., held 
that: (1) award of legal custody of children 
to wife was not error; (2) trial court erro-
neously ordered child support in excess of 
maximum guidelines amount without spe-
cific finding that maximum amount was 
unjust or inappropriate; (3) wife's expert 
was qualified to testify to value of medical 
equipment; (4) accepting wife's valuation 
of office condominium was not error, (5) 
remand was required to determine income 
from apartment building; (6) ordering hus-
band to cause corporation to transfer insur-
ance policy to wife was not error; (7) 
awarding attorney fees to wife was not 
error; and (8) wife was properly ordered to 
sign declaration that she would not claim 
children as income tax dependents. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
Covington, J., concurred in part, con-
curred in result in part, and filed separate 
opinion in which Robertson, CJ., and 
Blackmar, J., joined. 
1. Divorce <s=»184(6) 
Supreme Court must sustain trial 
court's decree in dissolution proceeding un-
less there is no substantial evidence to sup-
port it, it is against weight of evidence, or 
it erroneously declares or applies law. 
3% Divorce <*=>4 
Child custody statute, which was 
adopted after petition for dissolution was 
filed, did not apply in that proceeding. 
V.A.M.S. § 452.375, subd. 3. 
4, Divorce <3=>298(1) 
Award of legal custody of children to 
wife and temporary custody with visitation 
rights to husband was not abuse of discre-
tion in marriage dissolution proceeding 
where wife had been primary influence in 
lives of children and wife's parenting deci-
sion often conflicted with those of husband. 
V.A.M.S. § 452.375, subd. 2. 
5, Divorce <3=>312.7 
Allegations that one daughter moved 
in to live with husband after trial of mar-
riage dissolution proceeding would be con-
sidered as to custody and support on re-
mand of decree which awarded legal custo-
dy to wife and temporary custody with 
visitation rights to husband. V.A.M.S. 
§ 452.375, subd. 2. 
6, Divorce <s=>308 
Child support award based in dissolu-
tion proceeding where parents' gross 
monthly income exceeded $10,000 was erro-
neously calculated using straight line ex-
trapolation from a percent of income for 
child support based on $10,000 monthly in-
come where no specific finding was made 
that award based on $10,000 scheduled in-
come was unjust or inappropriate. V.A.M.S. 
§ 452.340. 
7S Parent and Child <3=»3.3(7) 
Court-ordered child support, as provid-
ed by statute, is to be amount reasonable 
or necessary for support of child when 
balanced against parents' ability to pay and 
family's standard of living. V.A.M.S. 
§ 452.340. 
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8. Evidence <s»543(4) 
Wife's expert witness was qualified to 
testify regarding value of equipment used 
in medical practice in dissolution proceed-
ing where expert had visited practice to 
examine equipment in question, including 
x-ray and computer equipment, and was 
familiar with secondhand market for medi-
cal equipment. 
9. Evidence <s»546 
Qualifications of witness to render ex-
pert opinion lie within trial court's discre-
tion. 
10. Evidence <s=>488 
Trial court was entitled to accept 
wife's valuation of office condominium 
when valuing condominium in dissolution 
proceeding, even though husband testified 
that market value of condominium was 
$55,000 less, where wife was joint owner. 
11. Divorce <s=>287 
Remand of dissolution decree was nec-
essary to determine income from apart-
ment building where record did not provide 
substantial evidence to support a finding of 
the monthly income from property. 
12. Divorce <8=>252.3(4) 
Dissolution decree properly ordered 
husband, as sole shareholder of medical 
corporation, to cause corporation to trans-
fer two insurance policies on husband's life 
to wife where husband made no showing 
that transfer could not be accomplished; 
trial court did not allocate corporate assets 
themselves as marital property. 
13. Divorce <3=>227(1) 
Ordering husband to pay wife $47,190 
in attorney fees was not abuse of discretion 
in marriage dissolution proceeding; award 
was less than bill for legal services. 
14. Divorce <3=»223 
Award of attorney fees in marriage 
dissolution proceeding is within discretion 
of trial court. 
15. Divorce <s=*308 
Ordering wife to execute written decla-
ration that she would not claim children as 
income tax dependents was not error, even 
though mother was custodial parent. 
16. Divorce <3=»286(8) 
Supreme Cou^t gives deference to trial 
judge when reviewing valuation of proper-
ty in marriage dissolution proceeding; trial 
judge is in best position to assess credibili-
ty of witnesses and apply proper values to 
property. 
17. Evidence <s=»489 
Trial court was entitled to disregard 
wife's uncontradicted testimony concerning 
valuation of her medical practice; refusal 
to include $25,000 unsecured debt allegedly 
used to purchase equipment for practice 
was not error. 
18. Divorce <3=>252.2 
Trial court is to make just division of 
marital property in dissolution proceeding 
after consideration of pertinent factors 
such as contribution of each spouse to ac-
quisition of marital property, value of prop-
erty set apart to each spouse, and economic 
circumstances of each spouse at time divi-
sion is to become effective; division need 
not be equal. V.A.M.S. § 452.330, subd. 1. 
19. Divorce <s»252.2 
Division of marital property was just, 
even though not exactly equal, where divi-
sion of assets was roughly equal. 
V.A.M.S. § 452.330, subd. 1. 
20. Divorce <^252.3(1) 
Trial court properly excluded pharma-
cy corporations repayment of husband's 
loan from marital property in dissolution 
decree where husband had advanced funds 
to corporation and repayment was used to 
buy husband's separate home. 
Mark S. Corman, Clayton, Christopher 
Karlen, St. Louis, Edward K. Fehlig, Clay-
ton, for defendant-appellant-cross-respon-
dent. 
Robert F. Summers, Theresa Counts 
Burke, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent-
cross-appellant. 
RENDLEN, Judge. 
In this dissolution proceeding, both hus-
band (Subodh K. Mehra) and wife (Rachna 
MEHRA v. MEHRA 
Cite as 819 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.banc 1991) 
Mo. 353 
Mehra) appeal from the trial court's decree. 
The parties were married in India in 1973, 
and their two daughters, ^haila, now 16, 
and Anjali, now 8, were born in the United 
States. The parties are physicians, li-
censed to practice in Missouri, with a com-
bined monthly income of $19,395.00 at the 
time of trial. 
[1,2] The trial court appointed the Hon-
orable Franklin Ferriss as Master and ac-
cepted his recommended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. We granted 
transfer from the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals, Eastern District, to examine the ap-
plication of the Missouri child support 
guidelines to monthly incomes in excess of 
$10,000. Applying the standards of Mur-
phy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 
1976), we must sustain the trial court's 
decree unless there is no substantial evi-
dence to support it, it is against the weight 
of the evidence, or it erroneously declares 
or applies the law. Further, we defer to 
the factfinder's determinations of credibili-
ty, viewing the evidence and permissible 
inferences therefrom in the light most fa-
vorable to the decree, disregarding all con-
trary evidence and inferences. Wynn v. 
Wynn, 738 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo.App.1987); 
Ware v. Ware, 647 S.W.2d 582, 583-84 
(Mo.App.1983). 
Child Custody 
[3] Husband first contests the trial 
court's award of legal custody to the wife 
and temporary custody with visitation 
rights to him, contending the court should 
have awarded joint legal custody pursuant 
to § 452.375.3, RSMo Supp.1988. This sub-
section, added in 1988, reads as follows: 
The general assembly finds and declares 
that it is the public policy of this state to 
assure children frequent and meaningful 
contact with both parents after the par-
ents have separated or dissolved their 
marriage, and that it is in the public 
interest to encourage parents to share 
decision-making rights and responsibili-
1. Husband notes that Shaila, the elder daughter, 
moved in with him after trial, and this, of 
course, was not in evidence before the trial 
court. As we remand the cause for further 
ties of child-rearing. In order to effectu-
ate this policy, the court shall determine 
the custody arrangement which will best 
assure that parents share such decision-
making responsibility and authority and 
such frequent and meaningful contact 
between the child and each parent, as is 
indicated in the best interests of the 
child under all the relevant circum-
stances (emphasis supplied). 
However, this amendment was not in effect 
at the time the petition in this case was 
filed on October 26, 1987, and is therefore 
inapplicable here. In re Marriage of Ross, 
772 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Mo.App.1989). 
[4,5] Nonetheless, assuming arguendo 
the amendment is applicable, child custody 
must be determined in accordance with 
"the best interests of child," § 452.375.2, 
RSMo Supp.1988, see also § 452.375.2, 
RSMo 1986 (containing the same criterion), 
and we do not find the trial court's judg-
ment erroneous in this respect The stat-
utes do not limit the discretion of the trial 
court to reject joint custody, and the court 
found that the wife has been "the primary 
influence in both daughters' lives" and that 
her parenting decisions often conflict with 
those of the husband. In his testimony 
husband admitted a difficulty in communi-
cating with his wife regarding the children. 
Imperative to the best interests of the child 
in a joint custody arrangement are "[t]he 
commonality of beliefs concerning parental 
decisions and the ability of the parents to 
cooperate and function as a parental unit." 
Massman v. Massman, 749 S.W.2d 717, 
720 (Mo.App.1988). "Unless [parental] 
guidance has some uniformity it may well 
be worse than no guidance at all." Lipe v. 
Lipe, 743 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo.App.1988). 
This first point is denied.1 
Child Support 
[6] We find merit, however, in hus-
band's challenge to the trial court's child 
support award. The court based its award 
on the Missouri Child Support Guideline 
Schedule of Basic Child Support Obli-
proceedings, the trial court should review such 
allegations, and if true, determine the proper 
course as to custody and support in accordance 
with the directions given in this opinion. 
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gations as applied by the Circuit Court of 
St. Louis County. This schedule, based on 
the Income Shares M odel developed by the 
National Center for State Courts, was pre-
pared by the Missouri Child Support Guide-
lines Task Force, funded by the Missouri 
Bar Association Family Law Section and 
the Missouri Department of Social Servic-
es, and was first published at 735-736 
S.W.2d Missouri Cases, p. XL, in 1987. 
Pursuant to the direction of the legislature, 
§ 452.340.7, RSMo Supp.1989, the schedule 
has since been adopted as Form 14 of our 
Rules, coincident with Rule 88.01, on Octo-
ber 2, 1989, and made mandatory as of 
April 1, 1990. The schedule sets forth the 
amount of child support as a proportion of 
the combined gross monthly income of the 
parents. At $100 monthly income, the ba-
sic child support for two children is thirty-
seven percent of income, and though with 
each $100 increase in monthly income, the 
amount of child support increases, the per-
centage ratio of ' 'support-to-income" de-
creases steadily to 15.5 percent when it 
reaches $8400. For monthly incomes from 
$8400 through $10,000 the support percent-
age is 15.5 percent, and the schedule ends 
at the $10,000 monthly income level with 
$1,550 in child support for two children.2 
This case presents the important question 
of interpreting these guidelines when the 
parties have a monthly income in excess of 
$10,000. 
[7] The trial court, finding the parties' 
combined gross monthly income to be $19,-
395, made a straight line extrapolation of 
the 15.5 percent ratio and calculated the 
children's support at $3000 per month ($19,-
935 x .155 = $3,006.23), with husband to 
2. The pattern of gradual steady reduction of 
child support as a percentage of monthly in-
come is as follows: 
Monthly Income % for Child Support 
pay 65.6 percent of this amount and wife t j 
pay the remainder. We interpret the 
schedule differently. Court-ordered child 
support, as provided by statute, is to be an 
amount "reasonable or necessary" for sup-
port of the child, § 452.340, RSMo 19C6, 
"and not to provide an accumulation of 
capital." Heins v. Heins, 783 S.W.2d 481, 
483 (Mo.App.1990), which must be balanced 
against the parents' ability to pay and the 
family's standard of living. See Wynn v. 
Wynn, 738 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Mo.App.1987); 
Wiesbusch v. Deke, 762 S.W.2d 521, 523 
(Mo.App.1988) Reed v. Reed, 775 S.W.2d 
326, 330 (Mo.App.1989); Pursifull v. Pur-
sifull, 781 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Mo.App.1989); 
In re Marriage of Cope, 805 S.W.2d 303, 
308 (Mo.App.1991); § 452.340(3), (4), and 
(6), RSMo 1986. Further statutory factors 
for consideration are "[t]he father's pri-
mary responsibility for support of his 
child," § 452.340(1), "[t]he financial re-
sources of the child," § 452.340(2), and 
"[t]he physical and emotional condition of 
the child, and his educational needs." Sec-
tion 452.340(5). The amounts indicated on 
the schedule are but a presumption of the 
proper level of support, given the monthly 
income of the parties, and we find the trial 
court's mode of extrapolation beyond the 
confines of the schedule unjustified in the 
absence of any specific finding that the 
$1550 figure is unjust or inappropriate. 
Further, the record does not reflect how 
the court determined husband must pay 
$800 per month towards the children's 
"special needs," which include private edu-
cational expenses of $1,133.33 per month. 
Accordingly, we remand the cause for fur-
Change in % for Support 
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ler proceedings consistent with this opin-
>n.3 
Valuation of Southside Medical Group, 
P.C. and Office Condominium 
The parties founded Southside Medical 
Jroup, P.C, their medical practice, in 1981, 
nd leased to the corporation an office con-
lominium on Mackenzie Road. At the time 
if trial, husband held 90 shares of stock in 
Jouthside and wife held 10. Husband was 
iwarded the condominium and all shares in 
Southside, but he complains the court erred 
n overvaluing the property thus awarded 
o him. 
[8,9] Gerald Magruder, the wife's ex-
pert, testified regarding the value of the 
Southside medical practice, and the hus-
oand contends Magruder was incompetent 
to testify as to the value of the equipment. 
This contention is not well taken. Magru-
der testified he had visited Southside to 
examine the equipment in question and was 
familiar with the secondhand market for 
medical equipment, having valued used 
equipment in connection with the sale of 
medical practices. The qualifications of a 
witness to render an expert opinion lie 
within the trial court's discretion, Tkarp v. 
Oberhellman, 527 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. 
App.1975), and we find no abuse of discre-
tion on the record here. Further, we do 
not find that the court's valuation of X-ray 
and computer equipment leased to the cor-
poration by husband, based on Magruder's 
testimony is against the weight of the evi-
dence or unsupported by substantial evi-
dence. 
3. Though our Rule 88.01 and Form 14 were not 
effective at the time the circuit court entered 
judgment on July 1, 1989, see Mueller v. Mueller, 
782 S.W.2d 445, 448-49 (Mo.App.1990) (Rule 
88.01 and § 452.340.7, RSMo Supp.1989, not 
retroactive), its decision was based on the same 
schedule and we find the principles enunciated 
above applicable in construing our Rule and the 
accompanying form. Rule 88.01 states that 
"[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that the 
amount of child support calculated pursuant to 
Civil Procedure Form No. 14 is the amount of 
child support to be awarded," and "[i]t is suffi-
cient m a particular case to rebut the presump-
tion that the amount of child support calculated 
[10] In valuing the Mackenzie Condo-
minium, the trial court apparently accepted 
the $?S0,000 valuation, including "leasehold 
impro\ ements," given in wife's First 
Amended Statement of Property, leaving a 
net equity of $28,000 in light of the $152,-
000 mortgage on the property. Husband 
contests this valuation, arguing the market 
value of the property is $125,000 with bal-
ance of $154,000 due on the mortgage, 
leaving no market value at all. Husband 
and wife, as owners of the property, were 
both competent to testify as to its value, 
Schulze v. C & H Builders, 761 S.W.2d 
219, 223 (Mo.App.1988), and we are obliged 
to defer to the factfinder's determination 
of credibility, Wynn v. Wynn, 738 S.W.2d 
at 918, which weighed in favor of the wife. 
Husband finally complains leasehold im-
provements were improperly counted in va-
luing both the condominium and the medi-
cal practice. The trial court awarded hus-
band the condominium, "together with all 
leasehold improvements thereto," and set 
its fair market value at $180,000. In valu-
ing the assets held by the medical practice, 
the court included $28,000 in "equipment 
and leasehold improvements," based on a 
balance sheet prepared by Magruder. A 
footnote to Magruder's "equipment and 
leasehold" figure, however, indicates that it 
does not include the condominium, and the 
following page of Magruder's report dem-
onstrates that the full amount listed as 
"equipment and leasehold" was actually 
the value of equipment alone, thus the ad-
dition of the term "leasehold" appears to 
have been inadvertent both on Magruder's 
balance sheet and in the trial court's find-
pursuant to Civil Procedure Form No. 14 is 
correct if the court or administrative agency 
enters in the case a written finding or a specific 
finding on the record that the amount so calcu-
lated, after consideration of all relevant factors, 
is unjust or inappropriate." Further, the con-
curring opinion of Covington, J., cites the statu-
tory factors of § 452.340, RSMo Supp.1990. 
Section 452.340 was amended in respect to these 
factors in 1988, and that amendment is not 
applicable to this case, in which the petition was 
filed October 26, 1987. In re Marriage of Ross, 
772 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Mo.App.1989). 
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ings. This did not result, however, in any 
improper valuation of the assets, as hus-
band would have us believe, thus this point 
is denied. 
Tucker Property 
[11] The parties were partners with an-
other couple in the 1812 Tucker Partner-
ship, whose sole asset is a four-unit apart-
ment building at 1812-1814 Tucker, owned 
and operated by the partnership. The trial 
court awarded the Mehra's partnership in-
terest to husband, attributing to it a net 
monthly income of $205, but husband con-
tends the operating expenses exceed the 
rental on the building, resulting in a net 
monthly loss of $542, thus the venture can-
not possibly be income-producing. Wife 
counters that husband may claim a $6,231 
tax benefit in depreciation on the property. 
The trial court apparently derived the 
$205 income figure from the partnership 
balance sheet designating "owner with-
drawals" of $3700 for the first nine months 
of 1988, which, divided by the couple's one-
half interest in the partnership, results in a 
monthly quotient of $205.55. The balance 
sheet, however, does not account for the 
mortgage payments, though evidence of 
such payments was presented at trial. 
The trial court apparently disbelieved 
husband's testimony and it is the exclusive 
province of that court to weigh the evi-
dence. Cole v. Plummer, 661 S.W.2d 828 
(Mo.App.1983). Because we are unable to 
determine from the record whether its 
judgment in this respect is supported by 
substantial evidence, we direct the court on 
remand to further examine this issue. 
Insurance Policies 
[12] Husband next charges error in the 
trial court's order to husband "as sole 
shareholder of [Southside Medical Group, 
P.C. to] cause [the] corporation to transfer" 
two insurance policies on his life to Rachna 
Mehra. Husband relies on cases such as 
In re Marriage of Ward, 659 S.W.2d 605, 
607 (Mo.App.1983), where the court held: 
4. Compare Secor v. Secor, 790 S.W.2d 500, 502-
503 (Mo.App.1990), where the parties agreed 
that property held by corporation of which hus-
The trial court's action in classifying the 
corporate assets as marital property, and 
dividing them between the parties, was 
reversible error. A marital dissolution 
decree may not purport to affect proper-
ty of a corporation that is not a party to 
the litigation, even if the corporate stock 
is primarily or entirely owned by one of 
the parties to the dissolution action. The 
trial court was limited to a disposition of 
the stock of the corporation which was 
admitted by both parties to be marital 
property. The trial court has no jurisdic-
tion to enter a decree dividing property 
that is not owned by either spouse. (Ci-
tations omitted.) 
See also Penn v. Pennt 655 S.W.2d 631 
(Mo.App.1983); In re Marriage of Schulz, 
583 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Mo.App.1979); V.M. v. 
L.M., 526 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo.App.1975). 
These cases may be distinguished, how-
ever, on the basis that here the trial court 
did not allocate the corporate assets them-
selves as marital property, but directed 
husband, as sole shareholder under the 
court's decree, to cause the corporation to 
transfer the two insurance policies on his 
life to Rachna Mehra.4 Husband makes no 
showing this cannot be accomplished, and 
we conclude the trial court did not misapply 
the law in this regard. Murphy v. Carronf 
536 S.W.2d at 32. 
Attorney's Fees 
[13,14] Husband finally contends the 
court erred in ordering him to pay wife 
$47,190 in attorney's fees ($42,558 to Schec-
ter & Watkins, P.C. and $4,632 to Ebert, 
Meness & Kriegel), and further argues the 
court impermissibly awarded fees for 
wife's expert witnesses. The bill sub-
mitted by Schecter. & Watkins was $58,-
785.65, including $7503.50 in fees for the 
expert witnesses. The court's award for 
Schecter & Watkins, "as and for their at-
torney's fees and expenses incurred in re-
spect of this matter," is less than the bill 
for legal services alone and does not by its 
terms include fees for the expert witness-
band was sole shareholder were marital assets 
and court treated the corporation as an alter ego 
of the parties. 
MEHRA v. MEHRA 
Cite as 819 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.banc 1991) 
eS, thus we find husband's argument merit-
less. Further, an award of attorney's fees 
IS within the discretion of the trial court, 
Caruthers v. Caruthers, 679 S.W.2d 358, 
,}60 (Mo.App.1984), and we find no abuse of 
discretion from this record. 
[16] 
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Following the parties' separation 
Income Tax Dependents 
[15] The trial court granted husband 
the right to claim the children as depend-
ents for federal and state income tax pur-
poses and ordered wife to execute a written 
declaration that she will not claim the chil-
dren as dependents. Wife argues the court 
had no authority to order her to execute 
the form, but such an argument was specif-
-cally rejected in Vohsen v. Vohsen, 801 
S.W~2d 789, 791-92 (Mo.App.1991), follow-
ing the view expressed by a majority of 
jurisdictions that have spoken to the sub-
ject. Annotation, Allocation of Dependen-
cy Exemption, 11 A.L.R.4 786, 791 (1990). 
Vohsen noted the 1984 amendments to the 
Internal Revenue Code which provided the 
custodial parent is generally entitled to the 
income tax exemption for dependent chil-
dren unless the custodial parent signs a 
written declaration not to claim the chil-
dren as dependents and the declaration is 
attached to the noncustodial parent's tax 
return. The court noted the amendment 
"was made to eliminate the need for the 
Internal Revenue Service to resolve con-
flicts when both parents claimed a child as 
a dependent," and "when the parent cannot 
agree on who is to receive the exemption, it 
will be appropriate for our trial courts to 
determine this issue." 801 S.W.2d at 791-
92. The court further observed that under 
the Internal Revenue Code, it is insufficient 
for the trial court simply to rule that the 
noncustodial parent take the exemption, 
and "to effectuate such an allocation, a 
trial court must order the custodial parent 
to annually sign the prescribed declaration, 
presently IRS Form 8332." Id. at 792. In 
accord with the majority view and per-
suaded by the rationale and ruling of Voh-
sen, we hold the trial court did not err in 
ordering wife to execute the waiver form. 
but prior to dissolution of their marriage, 
they sold their marital abode and divided 
the proceeds, each purchasing a new resi-
dence. Wife argues the trial court over-
valued the furnishings in husband's home 
and undervalued the furnishings in her 
home. Giving deference to the trial judge, 
who is in the best position to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and apply proper 
values to the property, and we hold his 
valuations are supported by substantial evi-
dence and not against the weight of the 
evidence. Siegentkaler v. Siegenthaler, 
761 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Mo.App.1988). 
[17] Wife next contends the court erred 
in undervaluing her medical practice. In 
calculating the value, the court explicitly 
refused to include a $25,000 unsecured debt 
to Boatmen's Bank, finding the loan was 
not required to be used in wife's medical 
practice. Wife argues her uncontradicted 
testimony shows the funds bought equip-
ment needed for the practice. The trial 
court, however, was entitled to disregard 
even uncontradicted testimony, 
Intertherm, Inc. v. Coronet Imperial 
Corp., 558 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Mo.App.1977), 
and we do not find its conclusion against 
the weight of the evidence. 
Division of Marital Property 
[18,19] Wife claims the division of mar-
ital property "should have been fairly close 
to equal" because there was no marital 
misconduct to justify unequal distribution. 
The court is to make a just division of 
property after consideration of pertinent 
factors such as the contribution of each 
spouse to the acquisition of the marital 
property, the value of the property set 
apart to each spouse, and the economic 
circumstances of each spouse at the time 
the division of property is to become effec-
tive, § 452.330.1, RSMo 1986, but a "just" 
division need not be equal. Siegenthaler, 
761 S.W.2d at 266; Ware v. Ware, 647 
S.W.2d at 584. Regardless, adding to 
wife's calculations the equity in the parties' 
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homes, as well as the jewelry set apart to 
her under the court's decree, the division of 
assets is roughly equal, thus we find the 
point without merit. 
Loan to Anjusha Corporation 
[20] Finally, wife claims the court erred 
in failing to distribute as marital property 
$20,000 in loans repaid to husband from 
Anjusha Enterprises Limited, a corporation 
formed by the parties to obtain a franchise 
from Medicine Shoppe International and op-
erate a pharmacy under that name. The 
parties were initially the sole shareholders 
of Anjusha, and the pharmacist managing 
the operation later obtained some shares. 
The couple advanced approximately $10,000 
to Anjusha at its formation in September 
1986, and husband testified that during the 
next two years following he lent approxi-
mately $43,000 in addition. Anjusha later 
obtained a loan of $93,000 from Boatmen's 
Bank, and husband received $20,000 from 
this amount as repayment for monies earli-
er advanced to the corporation, using the 
funds toward the down payment on his 
home. Wife contends the $43,000 was lent 
to the corporation from marital funds and 
that the $20,000 repayment, of which she 
was unaware until the time of trial, should 
have been distributed by the court as a 
marital asset. The trial court found, how-
ever, that husband had advanced the funds 
to the corporation and the repayment was 
not "squandered or secreted" by him. We 
cannot say this finding is unsupported by 
substantial evidence or is against the 
weight of the evidence. 
We affirm the trial court's decree in all 
respects except its child support award and 
its attribution of a $205 net monthly in-
come to the Tucker property, which we 
reverse. The cause is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings to consider these matters 
and the situation as to the custody of Shai-
la in a manner consistent with this opinion. 
HOLSTEIN and BENTON, JJ., and 
HIGGINS, Senior Judge, concur. 
COVINGTON, J., concurs in part and 
concurs in result in part in separate opinion 
filed. 
ROBERTSON, CJ., and BLACKMAR, J., 
concur in part and concur in result in part 
in opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in result in part of 
COVINGTON, J. 
THOMAS, J., not participating because 
not a member of the Court when case was 
submitted. 
COVINGTON, Judge, concurring in part 
and concurring in result in part. 
I concur with the principal opinion with 
the exception of the issue of child support; 
on that issue I can concur only in result. 
With respect, I disagree with the principal 
opinion that the problem presented is one 
of "an interpretation of the schedule." 
The schedule is silent when the family in-
come exceeds $10,000, thus does not apply. 
Furthermore, I fear that the effect of the 
language of the principal opinion may 
serve to deter trial courts from entering 
appropriate awards in excess of the sched-
uled amount. 
The amount of support scheduled to be 
awarded upon a $10,000 monthly income is 
not a presumed ceiling beyond which any 
award is suspect in that it might "provide 
an accumulation of capital;" If applicable, 
the schedule serves only as a presumed 
minimum in this case. Since the schedule 
does not apply when the family income 
exceeds $10,000 per month, the trial court 
should then be guided by the considera-
tions set forth in § 452.340, RSMo Supp. 
1990. The relevant factors include: 
(1) The financial needs and resources of 
the child; 
(2) The financial resources and needs of 
the parents; 
(3) The standard of living the child would 
have enjoyed had the marriage not been 
dissolved; 
(4) The physical and emotional condition 
of the child, and his educational needs. 
ROYAL BANKS OF 1 
Cite as 819 S.W.2d 
Section 452.340.1UH4), HSMo Supp.1990.1 
ROYAL BANKS OF MISSOURI, f/k/a 
Royal Bank of Mid-County, and f/k/a 
Citizens Bank of University City, Ap-
pellant, 
v. 
Harold L. FRIDKIN, Respondent. 
No. 73793. 
Supreme Court of Missouri, 
En Banc. 
Nov. 19, 1991. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1991. 
Lender brought action under $10,000 
guaranty of $50,000 note made by guberna-
torial campaign committee. The Circuit 
Court, Jackson County, Vincent E. Baker, 
J., granted judgment for guarantor, and 
lender appealed. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed and remanded, and lender appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Benton, J., held 
that: (1) $10,000 guaranty had latent ambi-
guity to extent it purported to guaranty 
$10,000 note, justifying consideration of ex-
ternal matters; (2) circumstances surround-
ing execution of guaranty and note demon-
strated guarantor's intent to be obligated 
to pay $10,000 of note; and (3) failure of 
committee's treasurer to execute note did 
not render it invalid. 
Reversed and remanded with direction. 
1. Guaranty <3=»27 
Rules of construction applicable to 
guaranty are same as applied to other con-
tracts. 
[SSOURI v. FRIDKIN Mo. 359 
59 (Mo.banc 1991) 
2. Evidence <3=>448 
Parol evidence rule bars extrinsic evi-
dence, unless integrated contract is ambig-
uous. 
3. Guaranty *»92(1) 
Determination as to whether guaranty 
is ambiguous is question of law to be decid-
ed by court. 
4. Contracts <3=»143(2) 
"Latent ambiguity" arises where writ-
ing on its face appears clear and unambig-
uous, but some collateral matter makes 
meaning uncertain. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Contracts <3^147(1) 
Cardinal principle is to determine in-
tent of parties when latent or patent ambi-
guity exists in writing. 
6. Contracts e=»147(l, 2), 170(1) 
In order to determine intent of parties, 
court will consider entire contract, subsidi-
ary agreements, relationship of parties, 
subject matter of contract, fact and circum-
stances surrounding execution of contract, 
practical construction parties themselves 
have placed on contract by their acts and 
deeds, and other external circumstances 
that cast light on intent of parties. 
7. Evidence ®=*452 
Latent ambiguity in writing must be 
developed by extrinsic evidence. 
8. Evidence <3=>452 
Evidence of note that fit description in 
guaranty in all respects except for principal 
amount, coupled with fact that note in 
amount stated in guaranty did not exist, 
created latent ambiguity that necessitated 
consideration of external matters to deter-
mine true intent of parties regarding 
whether guaranty pertained to note. 
9. Guaranty <3=>40 
Circumstances surrounding execution 
of $10,000 guaranty and $50,000 note dem-
onstrated agreement designed to limit 
1. As the principal opinion notes, the statutory 
factors applicable in the present case were those 
in effect in 1987. 
ATTACHMENT "B" 
TO REPLY BRIEF 
(Excerpt from "Dealing with Special Problems in Divorce") 
p\59630-I.013.chd 
Attached is the case of Mehra v. Mehra (Supreme Court of Missouri, 
November 19, 1991), which held, in a statutory scheme similar to the Utah 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines, with the highest level being $10,000 gross 
income per month, that it was improper for the Court to make a "straight line 
extrapolation" and the focus should be to determine the amount "reasonable 
or necessary for the support of the child." This case has been interpreted by 
some of the Court Commissioners and Judges in Utah to indicate that if the 
Utah Legislature had intended a straight line extrapolation under the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines, they would have provided for such. 
Some Judges may make a straight line extrapolation, but there is no 
consensus among the judiciary as to how that extrapolation should be made. 
In the Mehra opinion, the Court attempted to make an extrapolation by a 
percentage ratio. 
One way to extrapolate beyond the Guidelines by a percentage ratio is as 
follows: 
Take column for number of children. 
What is the dollar increase in support for each $100.00 
increment. 
Calculate the amount of the income in excess of the top of the 
table. 
Divide by 100. 
Multiply result by support increment per $100. 
Example: If the combined gross income is $13,500.00 for two children, the 
support increment is $8.00 per $100. 
Take the combined gross income of $13,500.00, less the highest amount on 
the chart ($13,500 less $10,100.00) = $3,400.00. $3,400.00 + 100 = 34 
increments. Multiply 34 increments by $8.00 per 100 increment = $272.00 + 
the highest level on the chart of $1,672.00. This is the total gross monthly 
income for support purposes. 
There is no consensus as to how the Judges and Commissioners are handling 
this issue and it would really be determined on a case-by-case basis and the 
preference of the particular Commissioner or Judge assigned to the case. 
